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p stindustrialization and Congressional 
c : ange: An Exploratory Mapping * 
PAUL LENCHNER 
East Texas State University 
This paper is a modest attempt to shed some light on an enduring ques-
tion: the relationship between social change and political life. The social 
hange is postindustrialization. The aspect of political life is congressional 
C 1 . behavior. The corre at10ns to be reported are not strong; thus the conclu-
sions will be hedged and tentative. Nevertheless, we will argue that our ob-
jectives were at least partially realized. 
Introduction: The Problem 
A number of longterm, interrelated changes in American society have 
led various observers to conclude that the United States has crossed the 
threshold into the postindustrial era.' In postindustrial society one finds, 
among other things, that the majority of the labor force is employed in serv-
ice rather than manufacturing or extractive positions; that there is a par-
ticularly sharp increase in the proportion of the labor force employed in 
health, education, research, and government; that the intelligentsia 
becomes more influential than ever before and the university becomes a cen-
tral institution in society; and that there is a sharp increase in educational 
attainments and income levels in the general public. 2 The prototypical 
postindustrial worker has a postsecondary education, a well-paying white-
collar job, and a suburban residence. Daniel Bell, the leading authority on 
the subject, cautions against a deterministic view of postindustrialization's 
impact on politics. 3 Granting the wisdom of this advice, one need not be a 
Marxist to agree that fundamental social transformations will inevitably 
alter a country's politics. That assumption underlies our research. 
The political parties/ electoral politics literature is suggestive of the 
kinds of changes we are looking for. Numerous studies have documented 
the emergence of a new breed of political activists.• Variously labeled 
"amateurs," "purists," or "the new presidential elite," the new breed are 
products of postindustrial society. They tend to be well-educated, well-off 
professionals (or spouses of professionals) who become politically active to 
promote a cause rather than to seek persona l power or material rewards. 
Their influence has been especially apparent in presidential nominating 
politics. In that arena conflict has intensified and become more focused on· 
issues and ideologies, relatively extreme candidates are more likely to be 
nominated, and the role of parties has been sharp ly reduced. As Everett 
Carl Ladd and Charles Hadley observe, a new "dynamic" has taken hold in 
•The author received an East Texas State University Faculty Research Grant in support of this research 
•ffon. Jack Ballard provided skillful research assistance. A version of this paper was presented at the 1979 
annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association . 
pre idential politics. Traditional accommodationist politics has been 
planted by the new, more conflictual po tindustrial variant.' sup. 
Where all this leaves Congress is a matter of some disagreement. 0 
course, Congress is not an unchanging in titution. Recent years have r 
increased membership turnover, modifications in long-standi ng rule een 
norm s, new structures and processes for handling the budget, and so fo;~d 
Yet a theme that runs through much of the literature (explicitly or implicit( · 
is that Con~r_ess has ~een rel~ti~ely unaffected by postindustrializat ion a:~ 
the new politics associated with 1t. For example, Samuel Huntington argu 
the persistence of provincialism in congressional politic . 6 Morris Fiori:s 
contends that the shrinking number of marginal seats in Congres is th a 
result of members' ability to duck controversial issues while providing im~ 
proved case work and pork barrel benefits to const ituents. ' The conse-
quence is that legislator s look more like old-time machine politician than 
the vanguard of the postindustrial order. 
On the other hand, some analysts have called attention to congres-
sional trends that are consistent with the notion of postindustrialization. 
David Mayhew suggests that despite the historic and continuing importance 
of providing particularized benefits and then claiming credit for them in 
members' reelection strategy, "credit claiming" may be giving way to 
" position taking" (i.e., taking a stand on an issue, often a national one, of 
concern to constituents). He states "t hat candidates running for Congress 
have been relying increasingly on position taking; we now have talkshow 
senators, a House rife with suburbanites, a huge and individualistic California 
delegation, a reformed New York City delegation." ' It seems that for some 
members the pork barrel is being overshadowed by the soap box. John 
Saloma provides perhaps the most sweeping view of a postindustrial Con-
gress. He predicts " a revolutionary change" in decision-making throughout 
the government based upon the "applicati on of computer-based technology 
and information systems. " 9 Saloma contends that the incrementalism 
which has traditionally characterized congressional policy-making will be 
superseded by more comprehensive approaches. In 1969 he wrote, "The 
real change in congressional attitude and skills will probably not be felt, 
however, until a new generation of political talent with practical experience 
with computers-through universities and the private sector-begins to 
enter Congress. This change will come sooner than most realize."' 0 
Perhaps by the mid-1970's its time had arrived. 
Hypotheses, Data, and Methods 
We anticipated that by the 94th Congress (1975-1976) the effects of 
postindustrialization would be selectively evident in the behavior of United 
States Representatives. Our expectation was that the more "postindustrial" 
a member's district, the more likely he was to behave in ways consistent 
with the descriptions of the new political activists by Wilson et al., and the 
observation s on congressional change by Mayhew, Saloma, and others. 
Specification of hypotheses, data, and methods follows. 
2 
our general research design is hardly original. In diagrammatic form it 
is: district --------► member characteristics behavior. 
dicators of district postindustrialization were readily available. Examples 
1
~ t might have been used include aggregate measures of median family in-
t ~e median school years completed, and percent white-collar workers. 
~:t high correlations a_mong ~any of the distri~t characteristics ar~ue~ for 
parsimonious selection of independent variables. 11 After prelimmary 
analysis, two were chosen: median family income in district, and district 
~ype (urban, suburban, or rural). If the majority of a district's population 
as urban, suburban, or rural, it was so labeled. 12 If none of the groups 
~omprised a majority in it, it was labeled mixed and was excluded from 
computations involving this variable. (Approximately one-sixth of the 
districts were "mixed" under this classification.) Relatively wealthy 
districts and suburban districts were considered more "postindustrial" than 
relatively poor and urban or rural districts. 
Three dependent variables were specified. The first was a member's 
most important committee assignment. We hypothesized that members 
from different kinds of districts would serve on different kinds of commit-
tees. (Underlying this expectation was the belief that committee assignments 
would reflect committee requests ,and that those requests would be influenced 
by district characteristics.) Drawing upon the work of Donald Matthews, 13 
George Goodwin, u and others, House committees in the 94th Congress 
were classified as follows: 
Power committees (membership helps gain power within the House): 
Appropriations, Rules, Ways and Means. 
Issue committees (membership helps taking positions on national 
issues): Armed Services, Banking, Currency and Housing, Budget, 
Education and Labor, Government Operations, International Rela-
tions, Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Judiciary, Science and 
Technology. 
Pork barrel committees (membership helps secure specific benefits for 
constituents or members): Agriculture, House Administration, Interior 
and Insular Affairs, Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Public Works and 
Transportation. 
Other committees (membership is generally involuntary and members 
leave as quickly as possible): District of Columbia, Post Office and 
Civil Service, Small Business, Standards of Official Conduct, 
Veterans' Affairs. 
Taking each member's most important assignment, 15 we expected, for evi-
dent reasons, that members from postindustrial districts would be 
disproportionately represented on issue committees, leaving members from 
"less advanced" districts to be overrepresented on power and pork barrel 
committees. 
Our second measure of congressional behavior was the volume of 
3 
legislation each member introduced. 16 It is part of the postindustrial styl 
be issue-oriented. We hypothesized the Representatives of the more P<> e_to 
dustrial districts would feel a greater need to take positions on natttin-
issues than their colleagues. (It is assumed that all members feel a n~llal 
~ake positions on _salient lo~~ issues.)_ ~ince i~tr~ducing l~gislation is a~ 
Jor way to establish a pos1t1on, prohf1cness m mtroducmg bills was con 
sidered a sign of postindustrial behavior. • 
The third dependent variable was roll call consistency. Nominal' 
politics in suburban, upper SES constituencies is likely to result in the sel'::, 
tion of issue-oriented candidates who will vote with ideological consistency 
if they reach Congress." Voting consistency was measured through scores 
compiled by the Americans for Constitutional Action. 11 ACA scores for 
1975 and 1976 were averaged, and members with scores between O and 15 or 
85 and 100 were considered to have consistent voting records. Members 
whose scores averaged between 16 and 84 were considered to have relatively 
inconsistent (or nonideological) voting records. 19 We expected the former to 
be concentrated in the more postindustrial districts and the latter to be over. 
represented in the poorer urban or rural districts. 
The hypotheses were tested through crosstabulating independent and 
dependent variables. For each pair of variables, their simple relationship 
was computed first. Then the analysis was repeated controlling for party. 
The results appear in the next section. 
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Resu;:ble 1 crosstabulates district median family income with member's 
t important committee assignment. A clear pattern appeared . As the 
~ot ict's wealth increased, so did the likelihood that its Representative's 
dis; iJl1portant committee assignment was on a panel oriented toward national 
~o es For all members and within each party 's delegation the relationship 
,ssu ~tatistically significant, and with a minor deviation among the 
;~ublicans it was monotonic. While the correlations were modest, ex-
a:Unation of the percentages was at least moderately encouraging. 
Most Imponant Commineea 
Power6 
tssuec 
Pork barreld 
Total 
TABLE 1 
Median Fa~ily Income and Most Important Commiuee 
A. All Members 
Median Family Income in District 
$0-7,999 $8,000-9,999 SI0,000-11,999 
31% (31) 22'1, (35) 24% (28) 
44% (44) 490/o (76) 68% (81) 
26% (26) 290/o (45) 8% (IO) 
IOl'loe(l01) 100% (156) 1000/o (119) 
X' = 31.271, 6 d.f., p<.001 ; Cramer's V = .19 
B. Democrats 
Median Family Income in District 
Most Important Commiuec $0-7 ,999 $8,000-9,999 SI0,000-11,99.9 
Power 30% (23) 22'1o (23) 250/o (20) 
Is.sue 47'1, (36) 52'1o (55) 65'1o (51) 
Pork barrel 23'1, (18) 26'1o (27) IO'lo (8) 
Total 1000/o (77) IOO'lo (105) 1000/o (79) 
X' = 31.193, 6d.f., p< .05; Cramer's V = . 15 
C. Republicans 
Median Family Income in District 
Most Important Committee S0-7,999 $8,000-9,999 $10,000-11 ,999 
Power 330/o (8) 240/, (12) 200/,(8) 
Issue 330/o (8) 41'1, (2 1) 750/o (30) 
Pork barrel 33'1, (8) 350/, (18) ~
Total 990/o (24) 1000/o (51) 1000/o (40) 
X' = 22.742, 6 d.f., p<.001; Cramer's V = .28 
:Excluding the one member who did not serve on a power, issue, or pork barrel committee. 
Appropriations, Rules. Ways and Means. 
$12,000 + Total 
22'1, (13) 107 
69'1, (41) 242 
~ 86 
99% (59) 435 
$12,000 + Total 
27% (8) 74 
670/o (20) 162 
-2!!.QL 55 
IOIO/o (30) 291 
$12,000+ Total 
170/o (5) 33 
720/o (21) 80 
~ 31 
990/o (29) 144 
C:Armcd Services, Banking, Currency and Housing, Budget, Education and Labor. Government Operations, International 
dRcl~tions, Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Judiciary. Science and Technology. 
Agr1cuhurc, House Administration, Interior and Insular Affairs, Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Public Works and 
Transportation. 
t-rotals may not sum to 100'7, due to rounding. 
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Table 2 reports the relationship between median family income 
volume of legislation introduced. The uncontrolled findings were as and 
pected. Only 24 percent of legislators from the poorest districts introdu: 
at least 200 bills. In contrast, 54 percent of the members from the wealthi 
districts introduced 200 or more bills. In the Democratic districts the Patteest 
was even clearer. Twenty-two percent of Democrats from the POor;:1 
districts introduced 200 or more bills, while 67 percent of their fellow Parti~ 
from the best-off districts introduced at least 200 bills. For the Republicans 
the differences were inconsistent and not statistically significant. 
Number of Bills Introduced 
0-99 
100-199 
200-299 
300 + 
Total 
TABLE 2 
Median Family Income and Bills Introduced 
A . AU Members 
Med;an Family Income in District 
S0-7,999 $8,000-9,999 SI0,000-11,999 
32% (33) 260/o (41) 16% (19) 
44% (45) 420/o (66) 36% (43) 
10% (10) 190/o (30) 26% (31) 
14% (14) 120/o (19) 230/o (27) 
1000/o (102) 99% (156) 1010/o (120) 
X' = 31.225, 9 d.f., p<.001; gamma = .28 
8 . Democrats 
Median Family Income in District 
Number of Bills Introduced $0-7,999 $8,000-9;999 SI0,000-11 ,999 
0-99 360/o (28) 240/o (25) 140/o (11) 
100-199 42% (33) 380/o (40) 30% (24) 
200-299 5% (4) 210/o (22) 25% (20) 
300 + 17% (13) 16% (17) 31% (25) 
Total 100% (78) 99% (104) 100% (80) 
X' = 38.789, 9 d.f., p<.001; gamma = .37 
C. Republican s 
Median Family Income in District 
Number of Bills Introduced $0-7,999 $8,000-9,999 SI0,000-11,999 
0-99 21 % (5) 31% (16) 20% (8) 
100-199 500/o (12) 500/o (26) 480/o (19) 
200-299 250/o (6) 15% (8) 280/o (11) 
300 + 4% (I) ~ ~
Total 1000/o (24) 1000/o (52) 101% (40) 
not significant; gamma = .14 
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$12,000+ Total 
8% (5) 98 
38% (23) 177 
32% (19) 90 
220/o (13) 73 
100%(60) 438 
$12,000+ Total 
00/o (0) 64 
320/o (10) 107 
320/o (10) 56 
350/o (11) ~ 
99% (31) 293 
$12,000+ Total 
170/o (5) 34 
450/o (13) 70 
31% (9) 34 
_____?__'!!__QL 1 
1000/o (29) 145 
In Table 3 the median family income data are crosstabulated with the 
CA scores of the members. The uncontrolled findings met our expectation 
:at Representa tives with the most consistent voting records (i.e., extreme 
t CA scores) would be disproportionately from the wealthier districts. 
11though the relati?nship was statistically significant, it was neither 
onotonic nor especially strong. When party was controlled, the data came 
~to much sharper focus. For the Democrats the relationship was as 
1 
redicted and was stronger than any other encountered up to this point 
r amma == .49). While 71 percent of the Democrats from the poorest 
!strict s had moderate ACA scores, an identical percentage from the two 
wealthiest district categories had extreme scores. For the Republicans the 
findings ran contrary to expectation. District income and voting consistency 
were inversely related, and the negative correlation was fairly strong (gamma 
== - .39). 
CA Score" 
Moderate 6 
Extreme< 
Total 
TABLE 3 
Median Family Income and ACA Sco re 
A. All Members 
Median Family lncomt in Dist rict 
S0-7.999 
63'1, (62) 
3711/, (37) 
100'1, (99) 
$8.000-9.999 
55'1, (83) 
45'1, (68) 
100'1, (151) 
SI0.000-11.999 
430/o (50) 
57'1, (67) 
100'1, ( 117) 
X' • 8.967. 3 d .f.. p <. 05; gamma • . 19 
B. Democrats 
Median Family lncomt in District 
ACA Score S0-7.999 $8.000-9.999 S I0.000-1 1,999 
Moderate 7 10/o (53) 55'1, (55) 29'1, (23) 
EJ;trcmc 29'1, (22) 4511/, (45) 7 1 'I, (55) 
Total 1000/o (75) 100'1, ( 100) 100'1, (78) 
X' • 32.343, 3 d .f., p < .001 ; gamma = .49 
C. Republicans 
Medi an Family Income in Dist rict 
ACA Score 
Madera« 
Extreme 
Total 
$0-7,999 
38'1, (9) 
63'1, ( 15) 
1010/o (2A) 
X' • 9.612 , 3 d .f., p <. 05; gamma • - .39 
$8,000-9,999 
55'1, (28) 
45"• (23) 
1000/o (5 1) 
$10,000- 11,999 
6911/, (27) 
31'1, (12) 
100'1, (39) 
$12.000+ 
5 1'1, (30) 
490/o (29) 
1000/o (59) 
$ 12,000 + 
29'1, (9) 
7 111/, (22) 
1000/o (3 1) 
$ 12,000+ 
7511/, (21) 
250/o (7) 
100'1, (28) 
:A-..eragc scores for 1975 and 1976 . Representatives who were not members bot h years were excluded . 
A"cragc score between 16 and 84. 
CAvcragc sco re bttwecn O and 14 or 85 and 100 . 
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Total 
225 
201 
426 
Tota l 
140 
144 
284 
Total 
85 
51 
142 
In Table 4 we turn to the correlates of the urban, subur ban , or ru 
character of a district. This table crosstabulates district type and member~ 
most important committee assignment. The findings for all members ~ ; 
the Democrats alone were as hypothesized. Suburban legislators were mo 
likely than their urban or rural colleagues to sit on an issue committee a:: 
less likely to sit on a power or pork ban;el committee. Among th 
Republicans a statistically significant relationship was found but not th c 
?ne anticip~ted. Urban members of the GOP were most likely to sit on~ 
issue committee. 
TABLE 4a 
District Type and Most Important Committee 
A . All Member s 
District Type/) 
Most Important Committee Urbane Suburband 
Power 2711/o (29) 2011/o (25) 
Issue 6111/o (65) 690Jo (86) 
Pork barrel 1111/o (12) IOOJo (13) 
Total 9911/o (106) 99% (124) 
X' = 31.583, 4 d.f., p<.001; Cramer's V = .21 
Most Important Committee 
Power 
Issue 
Pork barrel 
Total 
B. Democrats 
District Type 
Urban Suburban 
290Jo (26) 2011/o (14) 
580Jo (52) 7111/o (50) 
12% (II) 911/o (6) 
9911/o (89) 100% (70) 
X' = 19.751, 4 d.f., p< .001 ; Cramer's V = .20 
C. Republican s 
District Type 
Most Important Committee 
Power 
Issue 
Pork barrel 
Urban 
180Jo (3) 
7611/o (13) 
60Jo (I) 
Total IOOOJo (17) 
X' = 13. 115, 4 d.f., p< .05; Cramer's V = .23 
asee notes to Table I. 
Suburban 
200Jo (11) 
670Jo (36) 
130Jo (7) 
10011/o (54) 
Rurale 
2311/o (30) 
440Jo (57) 
340Jo (44) 
IOlll/o(l31) 
Rural 
2311/o (18) 
450Jo (35) 
320Jo (25) 
IOOOJo (78) 
Rural 
230Jo (12) 
420Jo (22) 
360Jo (19) 
IOI 11/o (53) 
bDistricts without a majority of urban, suburban or rural residents were excluded . 
CMajority of residents reside in central city(ies) of SMSA(s) . 
dMajority of residents reside in SMSA(s) but outside central city(ies). 
eMajority of residents live outside SMSA(s). 
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Total 
84 
208 
~ 
361 
Total 
58 
137 
42 
237 
Total 
26 
71 
27 
124 
Table 5 correlates district type and volume of legislation introduced. 
We expected that suburban members would be more prolific in introducing 
biJls than urban or rural Representatives. The results were otherwise. The 
ncontrolled data as well as those for the Democrats alone showed that ur-
~an members introduced the most bills followed by the suburbanites. The 
ural members trailed by a substantial margin. A statistically significant 
r lationship was found, but this resulted primarily from differences be-
~:een metropolitan (i.e., urban and suburban) and nonmetropolitan 
members. Once again the Republicans confounded expectation. District 
type was not related to volume of legislation introduced in the GOP. 
TABLE 5a 
District Type and Bills Introduced 
A . All Members 
District Type 
Number of bills Introduced Urban Suburban Rural Total 
0-99 160/o (17) 170/o (22) 320/o (42) 81 
100-199 33"1, (35) 370/o (47) 47"1, (62) 144 
200-299 150/o (16) 26"1o (33) 160/o (21) 70 
300 + 360/o (38) 190/o (24) 50/o (7) 69 
Total 1000/o (106) 990/o (126) 1000/o (132) 364 
X' = 45.521, 6 d .f. , p< .001; Cramer's V = .25 
B. Democrats 
District Type 
Number of Bills Introduced Urban Suburban Rural Total 
0-99 150/o (13) 130/o (9) 350/o (28) 50 
100-199 290/o (26) 32"1• (23) 460/o (36) 85 
200-299 150/o (13) 270/o (19) 110/o (9) 41 
300 + 42"1o (37) 280/o (20) 80/o (6) 63 
Total 1010/o (89) 1000/o (71) 100"1• (79) 239 
X' = 39.451, 6 d.f., p<.001; Cramer's V = .29 
C . Republicans 
District Type 
Number of Bills Introduced Urban Suburban Rural Total 
0-99 240/o (4) 240/o (13) 260/o (14) 31 
100-199 530/o (9) 440/o (23) 490/o (26) 59 
200-2 99 180/o (3) 250/o (14) 230/o (12) 29 
300 + 60/o (1) 7"1• (4) 20/o (1) 6 
Total 1010/o (17) 1000/o (55) 1000/o (53) 125 
not significant; Cramer's V = . IO 
8Scc notes to Table 4 . 
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Finally, Table 6 cro sstabula tes distr ict type with ACA scores. The dat 
are somewhat similar to Table 5. Here, too, a significant relati onship a a 
peared in the uncontrolled findings although the urban mem bers agai 
behaved a bit more "postindus trially" than the suburbanites . But thn 
results were clarified when party was controlled. Among the Democrats e 
moderatel y strong relation ship was found (Cramer 's V = .34). Subur~ 
bani tes were marg inall y more ideological than urbanites , and bo th group 
were much mo re con sistent in voting than the rural members. In contrasts 
among the Republicans district type was unrelated to roll call consistency'. 
ACA Score 
Moderate 
Extreme 
To1al 
TABLE 6a 
District Type and ACA Score 
A. All Members 
Distric t Type 
Urban 
40 "lo (42) 
60"10 (62) 
lOO"lo (104) 
Suburban 
49"lo (60) 
51"lo (63) 
lOO"lo (123) 
X ' = 12.764, 2 d .f., p <. 01; Cramer 's V = . 19 
ACA Scor e 
Moderate 
Extreme 
To1al 
B. Democrat s 
District Type 
Urban Suburban 
37"lo (32) 34"lo (24) 
63"lo (55) 66"10 (46) 
IOO"lo (87) IOO"lo (70) 
X' = 26 . 184, 2 d .f., p < .001 ; Cramer's V = .34 
ACA Score 
Moderate 
Extreme 
Total 
not significam ; Cramer 's V = . 15 
a5ec notes 10 Table s 3 and 4. 
Discussion 
C . Republicans 
District Type 
Urban 
59% (10) 
4 1 "lo (7) 
IOO"lo (17) 
Suburban 
68"10 (36) 
32"lo (17) 
IOO"lo (53) 
Rural 
63"lo (80) 
37"lo (46) 
lOO"lo (126) 
Rural 
72"lo (53) 
28"lo (21) 
IOO"lo (74) 
Rural 
52"lo (27) 
48"lo (25) 
lOO"lo (52) 
Total 
182 
171 
353 
To1al 
109 
122 
231 
Tolal 
73 
49 
122 
The findings prompted neither joy nor despair. Broadly speaking, our 
hypotheses were confirmed, but the relationships (though statistically · 
significant) tended to be modest. Controlling for party showed that 
Democrats were more likely to conform to expectation than Republicans. In 
the following discussion we will first offer some suggestions why the results 
were not more positive and then comment on the implicatio ns of what was 
found . 
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Had we not been forced to treat constituencies as undifferentiated 
hOles, our findings might have been more positive. Richard Fenno 20 and 
~orri s Fiorina 21 are among those who have written of the need to make in-
constituency distinctions (e.g., between a member's supporters and non-
tr~porters) when analyzing member-constituency linkages. This is sound 
s~vice; only the unavailability of suitable data kept us from following it. 
a Data limitations may have attenuated the relationships found in 
nother way. Obviously, our research design is elliptical. District 
a haracteristics do not directly determine member behavior. Rather, certain 
~ypes of districts tend to elect Representatives with particular attitudes who 
in turn behave in particular ways. Diagrammatically: 
District -------e► member ------► member 
characteristics attitudes ► behavior. 
Ideally, interviews would have been conducted to classify members accord-
ing to the degree of "postindustrialness" in their attitudes. 22 In the absence 
of interview data, member's education was used as a surrogate (under the 
assumption that members with advanced educations would be more likely 
than their less educated colleagues to have attitudes that would lead to 
postindustrial behavior patterns). But the attempt to correlate member's 
education with behavior did not prove fruitful, and the research design was 
kept in the simpler form reported earlier. 23 
Finally and most broadly, it is possible that our problem is not opera-
tionalization but conceptualization. Perhaps it is the very concept of postin-
du trialization and the postindustrial ociety that is flawed. While we do 
not accept this view, its proponents' arguments deserve some attention. Bell 
is charged with reading too much into demographic changes in society. For 
example, Peter Stearns 2' and Krishan Kumar 25 contend that Bell overstates 
the import of professionalization in the work force. Kumar notes that many 
people now in "professional" positions, such as teachers, social workers, 
and technical staff personnel, perform routine tasks and are increasingly 
subject to pressures from bureaucracies over which they have no control. 
Along with this "proletariatization" of the white-collar labor force has 
come a rise in unionization and strikes. Analogous claims could be made 
about the spread of higher education. Reduced entrance and graduation re-
quirements and grade inflation have cheapened the value of holding a 
degree, even a graduate degree. And increases in income have been fighting 
a losing battle with inflation for several years. Thus, there may be less to 
postindustrialization than meets the eye, and, in any case, the progression 
to postindustrial society is not necessarily linear. 
Bell is also charged with underestimating the continuities between 
politics in the industrial era and politics in the forthcoming period. Richard 
Hall, 26 Michael Harrington, 21 and others argue that corporate power has 
been and will continue to be the crucial determinant of American public 
policy, Consistent with the downplaying of demographic changes, these 
critics expect postindustrial politics to be a continuation of familiar pat-
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terns. In the words of one: "the politics of the 'postind ustrial' society Will 
be the politics of the industrial society-only, as it were, writ large. "21 1 
short, fault has been found both with the notion of postindus trial change .11 
society and with the view that political life is being altered in consequcn~ 
ways. Perhaps this is why our hypotheses received less than overwhehnina 
support. 
Turning positive, our most noteworthy finding was that significant dif. 
ferences existed in the behavior of Representatives that were associated With 
the degree of postindustrialization in their districts. Assuming that mor 
districts will take on postindustrial characteristics with the passage of timce 
even if the progression in each district is not linear, what does this suggcs; 
about future congressional politics? Extrapolating from the findings 
(which always involves some risk), it appears that future Congresses will be 
marked by increased concern for national issues and sharper ideologicaJ 
conflict, but not necessarily more productivity. This picture is quite consis-
tent with previous discussions of postindustrial politics. 
Most analysts of postindustrial society, including Bell, are not op. 
timistic about its politics. The dominant view is that politics will be more 
important with government being called upon to resolve more conflicts, but 
consensus will be harder to achieve. 1' According to Bell, "A postindustrial 
society ... is increasingly a communal society wherein public mechanisms 
rather than the market become the allocators of goods, and public choice, 
rather than individual demand, becomes the arbiter of services. " J 0 Among 
the causes of this situation are the proliferation of groups making claims on 
the community, increased concern with the impact of private actions on the 
public welfare, and continuing demands for better education and health. 
Political institutions are expected to encounter major difficulties in 
responding to the heightened demands made of them. One reason is that 
demands are now frequently made for broad, hard-to-meas ure policies. For 
example, when government is asked to provide "educatio nal experiences 
that enhance creativity," · it is hard enough to agree on what is desired, let 
alone how to get there. J , A second problem is financial. The rising demands 
on the polity will inevitably sharpen conflict for public sector resources.11 
With this strain on the public treasury demands by some will be perceived as 
threatening the benefits of others more so than in the past. In terms of 
Theodore Lowi's typology, demands will increasingly be for redistributive 
policies, and redistributive policy-making characteristically involves sharp, 
protracted, ideological conflict. n A final, related problem is the possibility 
of stalemate and frustration. In the overcrowded political arena, particular 
interests (or coalitions of interests) may have the strength to veto the claims 
of other interests, but not enough strength to realize their own aims.,. 
Our data are in line with this interpretation. The volume of legislation 
introduced by Representatives of the more postindustrial districts, as well as 
their committee assignments, seems reflective of the members ' desire to re-
spond to the heightened expectations of their constituents. At the same 
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·me their extreme voting records (with Democrats and Republicans 
t~ust~ring at opposite poles) suggest they will not have an easy time reaching 
~e compromises that are normally necessary for action. An observation of 
tvf ayhew captures well the situation we are describing: 
over all it may just be true that the level of [vote] mobilization ac-
tivity in Congress is declining. Electoral demand for position taking 
seems to be on the rise. In the House taciturn machine con-
gressmen are being replaced by voluble city reformers and subur-
banites. City and state blocs once maneuverable for logrolling pur-
poses are crumbling. For a member with a reasonably alert 
middle-class constituency the best course is probably to register an 
elaborate set of pleasing positions, a course that reduces the 
changes of vote trading. 35 
Before offering some concluding comments, a few words are in order 
about the interparty differences in behavior that were found. In five of the 
six tables the Democrats' behavior was more congruent with expectations 
than the Republicans.' In each Democratic table a statistica lly significant 
relationship was found which was consistent (to a greater or lesser degree) 
with our hypothesis. On the other hand, only three statistically significant 
relationships were found among the Republicans, and one of these ran 
precisely counter to expectation. In short, postindustrialization in the 
districts clearly had more impact on the behavior of Democrats than 
Republicans. 36 
These findings bring to mind Samuel Lubell's classic discussion of 
political parties in the New Deal and immediate post-New Deal periods. 37 
Lubell's argument, which has more recently been amplified and updated by 
Everett Carll Ladd 31 and Richard Rubin, 39 is that the majority Democrats 
are the more vital party-"the party of the agenda" in Ladd's phrase.4° In 
consequence, major societal trends are reflected in their ranks while the 
minority Republicans linger behind, reacting belatedly to the forces of 
social change. From this perspective it was not surprising that intraparty 
differences were sharper among the Democrats and that Democrats were 
more "responsive" than Republicans to constituency indicators of postin-
dustrialization. 
Conclusion 
Earlier some contrasting views about the relative import of continuity 
and change in congressional politics were presented. As is customary, we 
probably exaggerate d the differences in the opposing viewpoints. As is also 
customary, we shall now suggest that reality lies somewhere between the ex-
tremes. We do hope, however, that our synthesis is not as trite as the 
framework in which it appears. 
Judging from our data and other sources, today's Representative dif-
fers in noteworthy ways from his predecessors. Members are more concern-
ed with developing and taking positions on national issues, and their style is 
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more ideological. These changes are associated, especially among 
Democrats, with indicators of postindustrialization in the constit utencies. 
This in turn suggests that more members will behave "postindust rially" as 
the United States becomes more fully a postindustrial society. 
Yet members can hardly afford to neglect their districts. On the con-
trary, Fiorina makes a good case that it is improved constituency service 
that is at the root of the extraordinary reelection rate of House members in 
recent years . 41 What we seem to have, then, is not a new politics replacing 
the traditional congressional ways, but rather some new (or expanded) pat-
terns being overlaid upon the established ones. It is not the soap box replac-
ing the pork barrel but rather the soap box being perched on to p of the pork 
barrel. Members now feel compelled not only to secure tangi ble benefits for 
their constituents but also to take a prominent role in developing and 
publicizing policies to deal with national problems. 
In a 1978 column Tom Wicker made two seemingly con tradictory 
observations about Congress. With specific reference to tra de and tariff 
legislation, he pointed out that "logrolling, old stuff in Con gress," has 
become even more prevalent recently. At the same time he qu oted (and in-
dicated his agreement with) the comment of Jimmy Carter's legislative aide 
Frank Moore that "it ' s practically impossible to put together a coal ition for 
something anymore.'" 2 One might surmise that logrolling an d coalition-
building go hand-in-hand. The catch, of course, is that differe nt types of 
issues are involved. It appears that in the face of escalating demands on 
both narrow and general issues legislators are as adept as ever (perhaps 
more so) in logrolling on the narrow ones but are encounteri ng great dif-
ficulties in building coalitions on the broad ones. 
So today's Congress is an amalgam of old and new. If reelection rates 
are a valid indicator, Representatives have responded more than adequately 
to the increasing demands made of them . But reelection rates do not tell the 
whole story. There is also the rise in voluntary retirements and the com-
ments by veteran members that congressional life is not as enj oyable as it 
used to be. 0 Apparently being a master of both the pork barre l and the soap 
box is extremely taxing and often frustrating. Postindustrializ ation has 
meant that "virtually everything has been politicized, organize d and com-
puterized ..... And that, for Congress, has been a decidedly mixed blessing. 
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